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PREFACE
This series is principally concerned with current policy issues of
importance to developing countries but also covers those relevant to
countries in transition. The focus is upon policies which affect the
management of natural resources in support of sustainable livelilhoods.
Much of the series will be devoted to concerns affecting the livelihoods of
poor people in rural areas, recognizing the linkages with non-natural
resource-based livelihoods. It will also include the interests of the urban
poor, where these are linked to the use of natural resources as part of
livelihood strategies.
The series will take a holistic view and cover both the economic and social
components affecting livelihoods, and associated factors notably with
respect to health and education. The aim is to provide topical analyses
which are based upon field research where appropriate, and which will
inform development practitioners concerned with issues of poverty in
development.
The series is timely, given the increasing focus upon poverty and poverty
elimination in the agenda of the development community. It is also timely
with respect to the growing body of recent work which seeks to replace
earlier, simplistic structural adjustment programmes, with more flexible
approaches to livelihoods, institutions and partnerships.
Policy analysis is often assumed to be the remit of social scientists alone.
Whilst it is recognized that social science may play a pivotal role,
interactions with other disciplines may also be critical in understanding and
analysing policy issues of importance to the poor. The series therefore
draws upon a wide range of social and natural scientific disciplines
reflecting the resource base at the Natural Resources Institute.
iv
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper is about policies and interventions to promote increased access
to purchased inputs by smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of a
series of papers, targeted at a wide audience in the development
community, intended to contribute to increased focus on poverty by
informing and stimulating debate, policy and action amongst key players in
the development process.
Increased use of inputs in African agriculture is an important policy issue
because:
. most of Africa’s population lives in rural areas and is dependent on
agriculture for at least part of its income;
. in the past, increases in productivity were achieved through the
expansion of planted area, but as population pressure increases there
is less scope to do this; few African countries have been able to keep
pace with the food needs of growing populations and food imports are
rising steeply;
. much of Africa’s agricultural production is located in vulnerable, low
potential areas, and even higher potential lands are now showing
signs of environmental degradation;
. reform of agricultural markets has left many farmers with poorer
access to purchased inputs.
Five sets of issues affecting access to inputs are explored: affordability,
availability, access to information, risk and uncertainty, and the overall
commercial context. Case studies are used to illustrate how these issues
can be addressed.
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Credit is often assumed to hold the key to improved access. Different
approaches to input credit are reviewed and best practice measures are
outlined. Other ways to improve affordability are also identified: timing
input sales to coincide with times when farmers have cash; selling inputs
in small pack sizes suited to small producers (e.g. seed); and lowering
prices, by making cost reductions in distribution and marketing (e.g.
through bulk purchases, transport sharing arrangements, and farmers’
groups taking on more responsibilities).
Many consider the physical availability of inputs to be a more important
constraint to access with rural distribution networks in most African
countries being thin and unreliable. Innovative approaches to the
development of input stockist networks are reviewed, illustrating what can
be achieved through constructive partnerships between the commercial,
private non-profit, farming and government sectors.
Information constraints are also important – be they in terms of information
gaps (basic research on fertilizer response, for instance) or information
flows. Although farming is, to some extent, inherently risky, better
information reduces uncertainty, enabling farmers to make more informed
production decisions.
In addition to policies aimed towards the general development of rural
economies, a number of more specific policy recommendations are made:
. avoid actions which undermine the development of sustainable
commercial input supply networks;
. support input markets by setting standards and regulations, and
providing information and training;
. promote synergistic partnerships between commercial, private non-
profit, farming and government sectors;
. fill critical research and information gaps.
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1
INTRODUCTION
This paper is about policies and interventions to promote increased access
to purchased inputs by smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of a
series of papers which seeks to elaborate the relationship between
poverty, rural livelihoods and key policy areas. The papers are targeted at
a wide audience in developing country governments, donor agencies,
research institutes and other organizations concerned with development or
governance. They are intended to contribute to increased focus on poverty
by informing and stimulating debate, policy and action amongst key
players in the development process.
IMPROVING ACCESS TO PURCHASED AGRICULTURAL
INPUTS: WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
Smallholder agriculture in much of sub-Saharan Africa is essentially low-
input low-output. Since 1970, cereal yields in Africa have stagnated, whilst
they have trebled in Asia, and risen by 2.5 times in Latin America. Green
revolution technology has not been widely adopted. For example, for all
developing countries, the shares of cropped area devoted to modern
varieties are 57% (maize), 70% (wheat) and 74% (rice). Of these three,
maize is the crop most relevant to Africa but only 43% of maize area in
sub-Saharan Africa is devoted to modern varieties of maize (Fritschel
et al., 1996). Moreover, crops that are important in African food systems
are less important in other regions, and have been the subject of less
research (for example, sorghum and millet, roots and tubers, and cooking
bananas). Fertilizer use is also extremely low at 9–11 kg/ha (Badiane and
Delgado, 1995); rain-fed agriculture in India has three times the amount of
fertilizer applied to African crops (African Development Bank, 1996). Such
aggregate data, moreover, conceal extreme variability in application: five
3
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countries account for roughly 66% of fertilizer consumption in sub-Saharan
Africa (African Development Bank, 1996).
Increased use of inputs in African agriculture is an important policy issue
because:
. most of Africa’s population lives in rural areas and is dependent on
agriculture for at least part of its income;
. in the past, increases in productivity were achieved through expansion
of planted area, but as population pressure increases there is
markedly less scope for further expansion;
. few African countries have been able to keep pace with the food
needs of growing populations and food imports are rising steeply;
. much of Africa’s agricultural production is located in vulnerable, low
potential areas, and even higher potential lands are now showing
signs of environmental degradation;
. changes in agricultural markets following structural adjustment have
left many farmers with poorer access to purchased inputs.
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF AGRICULTURE
Sub-Saharan Africa, more than any other region in the world, is
overwhelmingly dependent on the agricultural sector. Agriculture accounts
for a large proportion of GDP and exports in most countries (other than
those with significant mineral deposits) and is central to the livelihoods of
the poor who are predominantly rural. It provides both direct employment
and secondary employment in handling and processing industries. Growth
in agriculture also tends to stimulate growth and livelihood opportunities in
other sectors, especially through increased demand for goods and
services. Agricultural development is also closely linked with environmental
issues of soil fertility, deforestation and water use. Anyone concerned with
poverty in Africa is necessarily concerned with agriculture because of its
role in the incomes and consumption of the poor.
Historically, increases in agricultural output in Africa were largely
attributable to the expansion of cultivated area, through the destruction of
forest and cultivation of increasingly marginal areas. However, the scope
to convert new lands has declined. For instance, the rate at which new
arable land was developed in Africa (including North Africa) was about
30% less in the 1970s than it had been in the 1960s, and in some regions
4
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the decline was much starker. In southern Africa, for example, arable land
development fell from about 2% per annum to around 0.5%. Reserves of
good quality land were running out, and farmers had little incentive to
expand given poor producer prices, labour shortages and the decline in
rainfall since the mid-1950s. It is now widely accepted that further
production increases can only come (with a few exceptions) from more
intensive production (see, for example, Badiane and Delgado, 1995;
Marter and Gordon, 1996; Lipton, 1988).
Analyses of trends in population growth, food production and incomes
consistently emphasize growing food deficits in Africa, under most
reasonable assumptions (see, for example, Agcaoili and Rosegrant, 1994;
Fritschel et al., 1996).
Population growth rates in Africa overtook Latin America and the
Caribbean in the 1970s. In many African countries the 1990 population
was more than three times that of 1950. The raw data indicate that in sub-
Saharan Africa, the countries with the highest population growth were
Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Coˆte d’Ivoire where 1990 populations
were at least 3.6 times those in 1950 (United Nations, 1995). (Caution is
needed, however, in interpreting much of the population data for Africa.
For many countries, current figures are estimates or projections based on
census data from the early 1980s.) Moreover, Africa is urbanizing at a
rapid rate; approximately 30% of the population is now urban. Table 1
illustrates considerable inter-country variability in urbanization but also
shows an unmistakable upward trend. (Total populations are included to
add perspective.)
Table 1 Urban population shares in selected African countries 1950–90
Urban share
1950 (%)
Urban share
1990 (%)
Total population
1990
Nigeria 10 35 96 million
Ethiopia 5 12 47 million
Democratic Republic of Congo 19 28 37 million
Kenya 6 24 24 million
South Africa 43 49 37 million
Tanzania 4 21 26 million
5
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One of the implications of these trends is that if African countries are to
sustain or improve current levels of food self-sufficiency, agricultural labour
productivity must continue to increase. This has happened, but not as fast
as population growth, and not enough to feed the growing share of non-
food producing consumers. For the population as a whole, per capita
cereal production has actually fallen by about 15% in Africa (1992–94
production compared with 1970–72, Fritschel et al., 1996). The data on
other staples (notably roots and tubers) are notoriously unreliable but it is
implausible that growth in their output has been significantly faster.
Banana yields have been falling in Uganda (where it is most important as
a staple). New cassava varieties have been introduced but the crop has
also been affected by some major pests and diseases, such as cassava
mosaic disease.
Much of Africa’s agricultural production and rural poor are located in low
potential areas (80% of cultivated area is low potential, according to
Delgado (1997)). This label conceals considerable differences in the
nature of low potential land but it does underline the challenges implicit in
increasing agricultural productivity in Africa. The term encompasses
consideration of economic, physical and technological factors, reflecting,
for instance, market access, the inherent productivity of the natural
resource base, and use of appropriate environment-saving technologies.
Land potential can change over time. Both high potential and low potential
lands may deteriorate through unsustainable practices, whilst infrastructure
development, changes in production technology, and policy changes which
favour domestic crops over imports, may improve potential. The key
issues of concern here are:
. production on low potential lands can only be sustained or increased
with increased use of inputs;
. whilst some of those inputs may come from within the farming
system, there is an important place for some purchased inputs
(particularly improved varieties and inorganic fertilizer);
. economic factors which contribute to low potential (poor market
access and low purchasing power of farmers) also limit smallholder
ability to purchase the required inputs, whilst low and uncertain rainfall
increases the risk associated with higher input systems.
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THE POLICY CONTEXT: IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT
Although somewhat mixed and patchy, there is growing evidence that
structural adjustment has reduced smallholder use of purchased inputs.
This can be attributed to various aspects of economic reform:
. depreciation has led to increases in the domestic value of externally
traded goods, and a relative decline in the value of non-tradeables; as
a consequence the use of imported fertilizer on food crops is now less
economic or even uneconomic;
. governments have closed loss-making credit programmes and
subsidized input schemes;
. remote areas, once served by the parastatals, have tended to be
neglected by private marketing agents, who have now taken over crop
and agricultural input trade;
. crop prices are less predictable such that risk-averse farmers are less
likely to use purchased inputs;
. removal of pan-territorial pricing has often had a strong impact in
more remote regions, both in terms of higher input and lower output
prices;
. the abolition of crop purchase monopolies has made it difficult to
establish viable farmer credit schemes, which in the past relied on
repayment being made when the harvest was sold;
. public sector spending restraint has reduced the resources available
to extension services.
INTENSIFICATION: PURCHASED INPUTS AND FARMER-
SUPPLIED INPUTS
The focus of this paper is purchased inputs. This focus is not intended to
imply any exclusivity in this strategy to increase productivity rather that
purchased inputs, even in small quantities, can usefully complement other
means of intensification. At the most basic level, this means improved
varieties and possibly fertilizer. Many of the issues affecting access to
purchased inputs are somewhat different to those that apply to farmer-
supplied inputs, and certainly demand separate consideration. In addition,
the economic context in Africa in which farmers take and act upon
production decisions has been subject to considerable recent change
making re-analysis of these issues an urgent priority.
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The most fundamental input that may be purchased is seed and even
where farmers rely overwhelmingly on their own or their neighbours’ seed,
occasional purchases of seed can usefully complement this strategy. The
third section of the paper discusses how informal seed systems can be
strengthened (not replaced) by access to improved varieties. Although
Africa currently plants a smaller share of crop area with high yielding
varieties (HYVs) than other regions, many authors argue that most of sub-
Saharan Africa has no alternative to HYVs, given population increase and
pressure. Moreover, the maize area is already significant (47% is planted
with modern varieties), and sorghum also has potential (Lipton, 1988;
Boughton and Reardon, 1997, citing Matlon, 1990).
As farmers intensify, fertilizer is the next most critical purchased input.
Although modern cereal varieties may out-yield traditional varieties without
inorganic fertilizer application, on most soils it is not possible to increase
yields substantially without some chemical fertilizer. Lipton (1988, p. 1249)
states that ‘‘organic manure can complement this, but there is seldom
enough, near to the crop, to substitute significantly for inorganics’’. Larson
and Frisvold (1996, p. 509) argue that ‘‘substantial growth in inorganic
fertilizer use is a prerequisite for sustained agricultural growth in sub-
Saharan Africa’’.
Many African farmers are scarcely able to afford purchased inputs of any
nature. Certainly, where used they must be used to best effect, which
means in combination with adequate water, timely crop husbandry, and
complementary farmer-supplied inputs, including organic fertilizer.
In addition to the extensive literature on this topic and related issues, the
paper draws heavily on fieldwork and workshops conducted by NRI in
Uganda and Zimbabwe in 1998 and 1999. The purpose of this research
was to identify viable private credit schemes that facilitate smallholder
access to production inputs. Whilst the work confirmed the importance of
credit, it pointed to a number of other constraints presently affecting the
use of purchased inputs.
8
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2
ISSUES AFFECTING SMALLHOLDER USE
OF PURCHASED INPUTS
Five sets of issues are explored:
. affordability
. availability
. information
. uncertainty
. commercial context.
There is no prioritization implicit in the order of the topics, they are all
important and linked by many interrelated issues.
Whilst some of these topics may seem obvious, most have several
dimensions. In the following section, where strategies to increase the use
of purchased inputs are explored, the importance of these different
dimensions becomes clearer. Thus, for example, affordability can be
improved by a change in the timing of sales.
AFFORDABILITY
Many African smallholders cannot afford to buy agricultural inputs.
Although this is a straightforward enough concept, it does encompass
different dimensions.
At its simplest, farmers cannot afford inputs because they are too
expensive. Many agricultural inputs have been subject to dramatic price
increases as a result of the removal of subsidies, price controls and
currency depreciation. Gibbon (1992) reports that under structural
9
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adjustment in Ghana, fertilizer and pesticide price rises exceeded inflation
by a factor of five or six. In some cases, the price structure and yield
response is such that the use of certain inputs may no longer be justified
on crops produced for the domestic market. Whether or not this is the
case, most African smallholders have limited purchasing power and
agricultural inputs represent a major outlay.
Whilst there may be some profiteering by traders, there are many other
factors which contribute to the inherently high costs of delivering inputs to
farming areas, under the market and infrastructure conditions prevailing at
the present time. These factors include:
. low volume imports – so less discount for bulk purchases and higher
per unit transport costs (the latter is particularly true of land-locked
countries);
. dispersed local markets making low volume purchases in a tightly
concentrated seasonal window – which all contribute to high costs per
unit of input;
. poor roads and telecommunications, and transport bottlenecks
(including the operation of transport cartels) increase transaction
costs;
. payment of bribes in order to obtain timely import clearance on
seasonal inputs, similarly bribes may be needed at other points in the
transport chain.
Closely related to price are the cash costs involved in input purchase other
than the price of the input itself (there are other non-cash costs too,
including the time needed to find out about inputs and to source them).
The purchase of inputs may require the farmer to travel to a local (or
distant) town, necessitating expenditure on transport and accommodation,
it may also require phone calls (where these are possible), or even signing
up for a larger package which includes unwanted inputs. Some farmers in
Uganda apparently sign up for seed and fertilizer packages available
through development projects, simply to obtain the seed, which is in short
supply.
Some inputs would be more affordable if they were available in smaller
pack sizes (notwithstanding the additional packaging costs). African
farmers tend to plant small areas; they plant many crops and they inter-
crop. When they try out new seed they often only want small quantities
10
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initially and may still demand modest quantities of seed which is known to
them. Obvious though this may be, inputs such as seed are often not
available in sufficiently small pack sizes. Even purpose-built seed handling
systems may not have appropriate pack size capacity. (For example, the
Uganda Seed Project, a parastatal concerned with smallholder seed
provision, has the capacity for 25 kg and 10 kg seed packs. In an attempt
to respond to farmer needs, they fill 5 kg and 2 kg packs manually, but
recognize that pack sizes of 1 kg and 500 g would be better still.) Whilst
retail outlets, projects or farmers may split packs, this always calls into
question seed quality guarantees.
Although credit may theoretically provide a solution to low purchasing
power, Africa’s smallholders are notoriously ill-served by formal credit
mechanisms. Banks regard farmers as high risk and high cost (because of
the small size of individual transactions) and tend to have poor rural
networks. Former loss-making state-supported schemes have been
closed, along with the schemes run by parastatals that had crop purchase
monopolies. Although some NGOs and other organizations are trying to
develop sustainable farmer lending methodologies, there are few good
examples, and farmer participation in such schemes is the exception
rather than the rule. Informal sources of credit are no doubt important –
particularly from friends and family – but inadequate, since expenditure
patterns follow a similar seasonal pattern in rural areas, with everyone’s
need arising at the same time.
Cash flow is important and the timing of expenditure may be a crucial
determinant of affordability. In poor households there is intense demand
for scarce cash resources, and a prior crisis may eat into resources
otherwise ear-marked for important agricultural inputs. In Zimbabwe, the
cotton companies sell next season’s inputs when they purchase seed
cotton, knowing that farmers have the resources to make purchases at
that time. Similarly, in Uganda, farmers grow cotton despite its
questionable profitability, and it seems that the timing of crop sales, which
coincide with Christmas and new school year expenditures, is an important
consideration.
The decision to purchase inputs for a particular crop may be influenced by
access to cash within the household and traditional domains of decision-
making. Whilst men are often involved in the production and marketing
decisions concerning traditional cash crops, women tend to play a greater
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role in the production and marketing of food crops. They may find that
their husbands do not attach a priority on input needs for these crops,
whilst their own resources may be too stretched to extend to input
purchase.
AVAILABILITY
Even when households can afford inputs, they may be unavailable. Again,
there are several aspects to this.
Despite large numbers of farmers, many African countries represent very
small markets for agricultural inputs, largely because of low purchasing
power. Thus many inputs may not be available in the country simply
because the volumes that can be sold are small. This is less of an issue
in, for example, Kenya, where smallholders and estates make high use of
inputs, than, say, Uganda, where the estate sector is small and
smallholders generally have low purchasing power. For example, Kenya’s
imports of fertilizer were 150 000 t in 1998, compared with only 10 000 t in
Uganda (Magnay, 1999). Whilst some of Kenya’s fertilizer imports are re-
exported to neighbouring countries unofficially, appearing in neither
Kenyan export nor Ugandan import data, this does not account for a
sufficient volume to eliminate such sharp differences in fertilizer
consumption.
Consideration of aggregate availability may conceal some important
distinctions. Fertilizer may not be available in the appropriate formulations,
for instance, or important complementary inputs may not be available,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the overall package. (In Uganda,
although chemicals were distributed to cotton farmers, too few had access
to the spray pumps needed to apply them.)
Farming is a highly seasonal activity and inputs are needed at very
specific times. Some peak needs can be anticipated (seed at planting time
for instance, even if planting dates shift depending on rainfall), whilst
others arise at short notice (the sudden emergence of a pest requiring
rapid action to save the crop). Where inputs need to be imported at short
notice, it is unlikely that the market can respond in time, and even where it
is a question of distributing inputs from the capital to rural areas,
information and transport constraints may prevent a sufficiently timely
response.
12
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For the farmer, the non-availability of inputs often manifests itself in the
first instance in the absence of local agricultural input retailers. Farmers
must generally travel some distance to locate inputs (sometimes to the
capital) with no guarantee of success or affordability. Moreover, where
input needs arise at short notice during the planting season, there is an
especially high premium on the farmer’s time, making the uncertainty and
absence of local outlets all the more problematic.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Information constraints arise at different levels.
The information constraint is first of all apparent in the straightforward lack
of reliable information on yield response to, for example, fertilizer, under
the conditions and soils prevailing in farmers’ fields. Application of inputs
at an inappropriate time, or inputs of poor quality, may contribute to a
perception of unreliable information on yield response. Fieldwork
undertaken in support of this study included stakeholder workshops. Even
though the small-scale farming systems in Uganda and Zimbabwe are
very different, stakeholders in both countries stressed the lack of
information on basic aspects, for example, crop yields, etc. Under certain
conditions, and for some inputs, research has been done but the results
may not be easily accessible. Nor would it seem that these are areas on
which an informed consensus view can be easily reached, given the
widely differing views expressed at the NRI workshops by relatively well-
informed participants.
Even assuming that the information exists, it may not be within easy reach
of farmers. Extension services in many countries have been severely
affected by public sector budgetary constraints leaving many workers with
their salaries paid but without funds to visit farmers. In many cases they
are doing the best they can in difficult circumstances, but certain problems
are widespread:
. bias towards less poor farmers, men and accessible farmers;
. lack of printed extension material available in local languages;
. messages not suited to conditions which prevail in farmers’ fields;
. inflexibility in adapting messages to farmer needs.
13
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As a consequence farmers rely heavily on information available from other
sources:
. friends and family;
. farmers with privileged access to information, for example, those
involved in trials, demonstration plots, seed multiplication or contract
farming;
. NGOs and development projects;
. farmers’ groups and associations;
. radio and newspaper;
. traders and purchasers of farmer crops;
. farm input retail outlets (where they exist);
. information provided with the product.
The first four are likely to have only piecemeal information expanding the
farmer’s knowledge, but with no certainty that s/he has sufficient
information on which to make a well-informed choice between
technologies or inputs.
Mass media may, in some countries, provide targeted farmer information
services but in many countries provision for farming communities is weak.
Traders can be a good source of information on preferred varieties and
may actually see enough farmers to gain an understanding of problem
remedies that work. Companies buying particular products, or running
contract farmer schemes, are more likely to have knowledgeable field
agents.
In an ideal world, retail outlets would offer comprehensive impartial advice
on the farm inputs available. Often, however, there is an incentive for the
trader to promote a particular product, and in many areas there is no
alternative supplier to which the farmer can turn for a second opinion.
(Recent work by NRI in India suggests that where retailers are farmers
themselves, and located within the farming community, they are more
likely to offer impartial advice.) Where products are retailed in their original
packaging, information provided with the product is likely to comply with
international standards (giving the active ingredients, intended use,
recommended rates and methods of application, and shelf-life). However,
this information may be in an inaccessible form (for example, written in
14
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small dense print, in a non-native language, using technical terms, etc.).
Such inaccessibility may extend to the retailer as well as the farmer.
An informed decision on the use of purchased inputs also requires
information on prices, and in thin markets (i.e. those with low and uneven
volumes of transactions over time), prices can be particularly uncertain
and variable. Likewise the transaction costs incurred in locating the input.
Again, stakeholders at the NRI workshops in Zimbabwe and Uganda
considered this an important issue affecting smallholder access to
purchased inputs.
Farmers need information on the safe use of chemicals and the means of
compliance with such recommendations. Whilst development projects
stress these aspects, and international companies ‘cover’ themselves with
the information they supply with their products, the reality is that farmers
are often unaware of particular risks. Even if they are aware, they may be
unable to apply the input in the recommended manner (making use of
protective clothing, for instance, or accurately mixing chemicals to the
recommended strength).
Another issue which arose at the NRI workshops concerned the standards
set/regulated by the public sector, and farmer/retailer need for information
on how to assess input quality where such standards do not exist or are
unreliable. This applied particularly to seed viability and arose in the
context of government plans to privatize seed production and sales units.
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
Farmer willingness to purchase inputs is also affected by risk and
uncertainty.
Low and uncertain rainfall is closely linked to low use of purchased inputs,
since it creates additional yield risk. Most African agriculture is rain-fed,
only 8% of cereal production is irrigated, compared with 20–40% in other
developing regions.
Where output prices are volatile, farmers may be unwilling to apply inputs
for fear that they may not cover costs. Maize prices in Uganda are a case
in point. They are subject to major fluctuations largely on account of large,
‘lumpy’, unpredictable relief purchases for neighbouring countries. In some
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years, maize is a highly profitable crop for farmers, whilst in other years,
other crops offer much better returns.
The quality and suitability of a particular input is a further source of
uncertainty. Chemicals, in particular, are often very specific and expensive
and farmers will be reluctant to apply them unless confident of their
suitability. Unviable seeds are another problem. Whilst suppliers may
willingly replace or refund when seeds are found to be unviable, planting
has to be repeated and the ideal sowing date has passed.
Some farmers are aware of northern market concerns about the use of
chemicals, and in some countries there may be a small local market for
organic products. Organic export schemes are becoming established in
developing countries – in some cases merely putting a more profitable
label on long established practices. This may add to farmer uncertainty on
the use of purchased inputs, particularly inorganic fertilizer, chemicals and
genetically modifed crops, because of his/her concern about being able to
market the crop, or because of concern over local environmental harm.
COMMERCIAL CONTEXT
There are a number of ways in which the commercial context affects the
use of purchased inputs. These issues overlap with some of the other
topics already discussed, but as a group they offer an additional
explanation for overall levels of input use. These issues were highlighted
particularly by stakeholders at the workshop in Uganda where most
farmers were characterized as operating partly or largely in a non-
commercial way, but with important exceptions in areas bordering Kenya,
where marketing is easier, and has taken place without disruption for a
much longer period than is typical elsewhere in areas subjected to long-
term civil disruption.
Farmers’ expectations of being able to market their crop at a remunerative
price are an important determinant of willingness to use purchased inputs.
Although market prices may vary, some will be subject to larger
fluctuations than others (Ugandan maize, for example). With sufficient
experience, farmers may, nonetheless, develop technology strategies
which are robust in the face of expected price variation, or where
resources permit, may be able to take a calculated risk on the likelihood of
covering costs.
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Where debt amnesties and subsidized credit programmes have been
common, it may be more difficult to establish viable credit schemes than in
situations where those taking out loans expect to repay them. Viable credit
schemes need to have the capacity to impose penalties, but if these
become the norm rather than the exception, the cost of enforcing
repayment may become excessive. Smallholder credit schemes in Uganda
and Zimbabwe provide contrasting evidence of financial discipline. In the
former, there are few examples of viable farmer credit schemes, with
strategic default common. A private scheme mounted by one of the cotton
companies found that although they had planned to seize assets in the
event of default, this was socially and politically impossible to enforce. In
Zimbabwe, however, the private cotton companies have managed to
enforce such measures and have achieved high repayment rates in
excess of 98% (although interestingly the state-run Agricultural Finance
Corporation has suffered high rates of default among the farmers with
whom it deals).
Many parts of rural Africa are poorly connected to local towns, and not
well served by specialist retail outlets, crop traders and transport networks.
Although farming is the single most important source of livelihood in most
rural areas, it is often extremely difficult to obtain farm inputs. In
recognition of this, government offices (often extension units), NGOs and
projects may market some inputs. The absence of retail outlets is not
limited to farm inputs. It affects all sectors and reflects the limited
purchasing power of farming communities.
When taken together, these factors which reduce access to inputs,
combine to create an additional disincentive: high and unpredictable
transaction costs. Trading in small quantities, to dispersed markets, with
irregular, seasonal demand, contributes to high transaction costs (low
volume transactions incur the same fixed ‘negotiation’ costs as those for
higher volumes, and also incur higher unit transport costs than could be
negotiated for regular or larger shipments, exacerbated by lack of
competitive pressure). High transaction costs incurred by the trader
translate into higher retail prices, and in addition to these, transaction
costs incurred by the farmer contribute to uncertainty and conflict with
alternative uses of his/her time and resources.
In Uganda, it is often argued that years of civil strife made many farmers
adopt low risk, food self-sufficient farming strategies. In this context,
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farming was not really a business, more a means of producing food for the
household, subject to certain constraints. Although most parts of Uganda
are now more secure, commercial sector development is only taking place
slowly. Yet where increased pressure on land necessitates greater use of
purchased inputs, it is useful to emphasize the business aspect of farming
because it is only within this financial and trading context that farmers are
likely to recognize that careful use of selected purchased inputs is a viable
strategy. The situation in Uganda is probably more extreme than that
experienced in many countries, but the principle nonetheless has wide
application. Farmer willingness to use purchased inputs depends in part
on the overall commercial environment, including the extent to which
farming decisions are influenced by business (profitability) criteria.
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3
IMPROVING ACCESS: RECENT
EXPERIENCE AND BEST PRACTICE
This section provides a menu of practical ways in which constraints to
purchased input access can be addressed. Drawing on recent (1990s)
African experience, the material is presented in two main sub-sections:
. the use of credit to improve access to purchased inputs;
. mechanisms to improve input access that do not rely on credit.
These different approaches were developed as a response to different
country and farmer circumstances and each has its strengths and
weaknesses.
USING CREDIT TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO PURCHASED
INPUTS
Four approaches are discussed:
. cotton farmer credit schemes used in Uganda;
. cotton farmer credit schemes used in Zimbabwe;
. intensively managed outgrower schemes;
. extending banking services to smallholders.
Cotton companies taking a joint loan to provide inputs for
farmers in Uganda
Liberalization of the cotton sector in Uganda led to substantial private
investment in ginning. Ginning capacity greatly exceeded the cotton
harvest. Farmers, who had bitter memories of low state-controlled cotton
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prices and an unreliable voucher payment system, were unwilling or
unable to buy inputs (even seed). Whilst the cash payments made by the
privatized ginneries were gradually attracting more farmers back into
cotton, this alone seemed insufficient to boost output as rapidly as the
ginners hoped. The initial response by one of the larger ginneries was to
launch an ill-fated input credit scheme (for seed and pesticides). The
scheme proved disastrous as the majority of smallholders defaulted on
their loans, due to a combination of side-selling (avoiding repayment of
loans by selling to another ginner) and a poor harvest (it was the El Ninˇo
year). It proved impossible to enforce the purchase agreements and
attempts to seize assets proved unworkable.
In order to remove the possibility of side-selling, the Uganda Ginners and
Exporters Association (UGEA) was formed, with compulsory membership
of all cotton ginners. For the 1998/99 season, the UGEA financed the
input credit scheme from a Bank of Uganda loan, guaranteed by the
Ugandan Government. The Cotton Development Organization (CDO), a
parastatal formed when the sector was liberalized to provide co-ordination
and regulatory services, played a critical role in the development and
operation of the input credit scheme. The CDO has co-ordinated the
distribution of cottonseed and pesticides. Smallholders are free to sell their
seed cotton to any ginner. The ginners are responsible for loan repayment,
and these costs are met through a levy payable against volumes of cotton
ginned by each ginner. (Volumes are assessed by independent monitors
assigned to each ginnery.) Average (not individual) input costs are
factored into the seed cotton price paid to farmers (and all farmers, bar
those registered in an organic scheme, receive the same cotton price
irrespective of the quantity of inputs supplied to the individual farmer).
Side-selling is prevented by removing the option of selling to alternative
buyers: all ginners are members of the UGEA so it is impossible for a
farmer to sell cotton to buyers outside the scheme. Levy avoidance by
individual ginners has been reduced by the presence of monitors in the
ginneries and dialogue with border officials and spinning factories, where
ginners (or farmers) may try to make illegal sales.
The scheme is certainly not problem-free and suffers from:
. difficulties assuring the timeliness of input delivery;
. diversion of inputs by intermediaries responsible for their distribution,
or attempts to charge farmers for the inputs at the point of delivery;
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. inputs given out to non-cotton farmers and cotton farmers going without;
. farmers using the inputs on other crops, or selling them;
. too few spray pumps with which to apply the chemicals;
. farmers do not have the opportunity to make an informed decision
based on the cost and benefits of pesticide application;
. getting ginners and government to agree to the scheme seemed to
depend on assurances that costs to farmers and ginners would be
contained; as a consequence, an unrealistic harvest forecast was used
(which virtually assured a government subsidy in the form of the loan
guarantee) and farmers were told that input costs would be shared
50:50 by farmers and ginners (this was deliberately misleading – the
input loan directly affects the price ginners can afford to pay farmers);
. more efficient producers pay more for their inputs (because they sell
more cotton, and a uniform deduction per kilogram of seed cotton sold
is made for the cost of the inputs) whilst less efficient producers face
lower cost inputs;
. critics contend that the scheme is vulnerable to rent-seeking at all
levels.
Moreover, the sustainability of the scheme is in question because: the
element of subsidy (its first year of operation turned out to be heavily
subsidized by the Government guarantee because the levy on cotton
volumes ginned was based on an over-optimistic harvest forecast, and
CDO’s own co-ordination inputs are currently provided without charge to
the industry); the absence of capacity-building to help farmers make
appropriate production decisions; and ‘leakage’ of inputs which may
threaten the intended impact on output. Yet for the next year, the ginners
plan to take out a commercial loan with private crop insurance to cover a
shortfall due to natural disaster and this ‘stake’ should provide inherent
pressure (on CDO) for a higher quality (less ‘leaky’) operation.
A scheme with so many problems cannot be described as a model yet it is
an interesting example of a pragmatic stop-gap measure to increase
farmer productivity. Its coverage is impressive – around 300 000
smallholders who are, to a certain extent, self-selecting resource-poor
farmers (because although now low risk, cotton is not very profitable, and,
therefore, unattractive to farmers with other choices or able to bear more
risk). The challenges are essentially two-fold: to improve the operation so
that the benefits are maximized whilst containing the cost; and
simultaneously to build longer term farmer capacity through extension and
group activities.
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Cotton companies in Zimbabwe providing inputs on credit to
farmers
In contrast to Uganda, there has been no co-operation between the three
ginning companies in Zimbabwe, although all rely to some extent on
smallholder cotton production. Two of the companies operate input credit
schemes. Both companies have a similar approach for overcoming the
problem of side-selling.
. All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one
member of the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may
be subsequently excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives
to repay. It also encourages group members to monitor and help one
another to ensure that there is no default.
. Groups performing well receive cash rewards.
. If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily
on defaulters, seizing assets when necessary.
. Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with
smallholders, building closer relationships and a sense of loyalty to
the company.
. Services are provided in addition to the input credit: extension advice
is provided, and one company has recently introduced cash loans.
Again, these additional benefits of ‘belonging’ to a company help to
strengthen relationships and loyalty.
Individual farmer participation in the input scheme depends on repayment
records, acceptance by other members of the group, and the achievement
of a certain minimum yield. Around 25% or 53 000 smallholder cotton
farmers participate in the schemes, and in contrast to the Ugandan
situation, these tend to be the more able farmers. The schemes are
intended to help such farmers expand production, whilst other farmers are
expected to make cash payments for inputs.
Schemes in both countries are still in their infancy. In Uganda, the
performance of the UGEA scheme cannot be fully judged because it has
only been running for one season. Box 1 compares the performance of the
two schemes based on the information currently available. One interesting
conclusion is that although the Ugandan scheme is far from being a model
farmer credit scheme, its coverage (and in particular, its ability to reach
poorer farmers) is extremely impressive. The Zimbabwean schemes may
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Box 1 The performance of the cotton input schemes in Uganda and Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Uganda
Repayment 1997/98 season repayment rates for the
two schemes were 98% and 100%.
Only 50% of input loan repaid – an
unrealistic harvest forecast resulted in low
per kilogram cotton repayments by ginners
and virtually assured that government
guarantee would apply.
Coverage 1998/99 season (both schemes):
53 000 smallholders
This represents about 25% of smallholder
cotton farmers, generally farming on
communal or resettled land (small plots,
unirrigated and typically on marginal land).
For 1998/99 season.
Cottonseed distributed to around 300 000
smallholder farmers, typically farming on
small unirrigated plots. The scheme is
intended to reach all cotton farmers (except
those enrolled in a separate organic scheme).
Efficient use of inputs Although no data are available, inputs are
likely to be used efficiently.
. Input use is closely monitored and
extension advice is provided.
. Farmers pay for inputs so have good
reason to use them wisely.
. Inputs are supplied at cost price
(cheaper than local market prices due
to bulk buying by cotton companies
and no retail margin).
Evidence of significant ‘leakage’.
. Inputs not necessarily available when
needed in a form that farmers can use
(i.e. too few spray pumps).
. Perverse incentives which encourage
less efficient producers and discourage
the more efficient.
. Monitoring and extension advice is
provided but reports of diversion of
inputs and late delivery were widespread.
Subsidies One scheme includes a small element of
concessional funds from a former World
Bank loan at below market interest rates.
The other scheme is partly reliant on low
interest Agricultural Finance Corporation
loans.
UGEA used donor funds loaned at below
market interest rates backed up by a
government guarantee.
CDO do not charge for the logistics
support provided (government/donor funds
used for this).
UGEA’s inability to repay loan amounts to
50% subsidy.
Contribution to cotton
sector development
Smallholder credit contributes to increased
production but significant numbers of
producers do not use it.
Production credit almost certainly a critical
component in cotton sector recovery.
UGEA plan to continue scheme with
commercial loan and insurance cover.
Wider development
impacts
Potential to expand financial services
available to cotton farmers (e.g. savings
schemes) with wider development impacts.
Group approach helps build community-level
capacities.
Whilst cotton production may increase
farmer incomes, the present input scheme
does not contribute to wider farmer
benefits relating to, for example, group
capacity-building and financial discipline.
Sustainability Appears sustainable:
. subsidy is small
. capacity-building
. demonstrated ability to repay
. process permits further development.
Questionable:
. unless costs can be significantly
reduced
. inputs more focused on intended
beneficiaries
. dependence on subsidy reduced.
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represent best practice in credit delivery, but the beneficiaries are
principally (and deliberately) the more able farmers.
Zimbabwe’s experience with intensively managed outgrower
schemes
The term ‘outgrower scheme’ is often reserved for schemes where agri-
business has considerable control over the smallholder production process,
providing a large number of services, such as input credits, tillage, spraying
and harvesting. The smallholder provides land and labour in return for this
comprehensive extension/input package. The high value horticultural export
sector is currently the focus of considerable outgrower scheme development
(for example, Hortico in Zimbabwe and Homegrown in Kenya).
European supermarkets are the main market for horticultural exports from
sub-Saharan Africa. Quality requirements are exacting in terms of physical
appearance and food safety, which in turn requires highly developed
technical and managerial production skills. In addition, supermarkets need
to be able to trace produce back to the grower. Together, this implies a
close working relationship between the farmer and the exporter, and a
sophisticated system for providing agricultural services. In these schemes,
the high cost of the service provided by the company involved is justified
by the high value of the final product.
Hortico in Zimbabwe operates an outgrower scheme producing and
exporting babycorn and mange-tout beans to the European market.
Success has been achieved by establishing a thorough supervisory system
and rigid enforcement of standards. By early 1999, 3000 farmers were
contracted to sell their produce to Hortico at a price guaranteed at the
beginning of the crop cycle; 60% of participating farmers are women. The
amount grown by each farmer is restricted. This ensures that production of
other crops is not neglected, whilst adequate attention is devoted to the
export crop. Training, technical support, inputs and spraying are provided
by the company, and farmers provide labour, land and irrigation (using
watering cans). Contact between the company and the farmer is frequent,
a lorry visits each farmer every second day. This reduces the possibility of
side-selling. Cost recovery on inputs is nearly 100%.
Close monitoring of farm operations, a high level of technical support, and
frequent contact with the smallholders, are required to operate outgrower
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schemes successfully. There may be scope for increased use of producer
groups to reduce costs of the schemes and allow some of the services
provided by the company to be assumed by the group. Such schemes
allow smallholders to participate in high value export sector development,
producing specific products to exacting standards, whilst export companies
find that the labour-intensive nature of some of the crops is ideally suited
to small unit operations.
Piloting rural banking services in Uganda
In 1998 Uganda’s Centenary Bank commenced a pilot scheme targeting
financial services to smallholders. The scheme is currently operated at one
branch only (Mbale), though if successful it will eventually be extended to
all their branches (currently 12, though planned to increase to 24 by 2002).
The underpinning philosophy of the bank is that the emphasis should be
on the ability of the borrower to repay a loan, rather than security of the
loan. In other schemes where loan security has been the overriding
concern, mechanisms such as group-lending have been used so that peer
pressure can substitute for collateral. Regular and frequent repayment
instalments are another means by which loan security (i.e. repayment of
the loan) can be safeguarded.
The Centenary approach places the emphasis on ability to repay. Loans
are made against a projected cash flow. Household budget analysis is key:
after the initial application, a Bank Field Officer visits the household to
carry out an analysis of household income and expenditure, based on all
income (on-farm and off-farm), and all household expenditures. From this,
an estimate of household cash flow, with and without a loan, can be made.
Loans are made when it is clear that the loan can be repaid. Repayment
terms are then tailored to fit the cash flow analysis. The field officers are
qualified agronomists who have also been trained in rural finance. As
such, they are able to recognize the agricultural potential of a farm, and
judge the profitability of the activities that will contribute to loan repayment.
Although security is not the basis on which the loan is made, a variety of
tools are used to secure the loan, at least partially: guarantors, land titles
(including those for customary tenure), post-dated cheques (it is a criminal
offence to have a cheque returned by a bank in Uganda), seizure of
assets, and using standing crops as collateral.
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In Uganda the scheme is particularly innovative, because recent
experience with loan schemes has been poor. (Civil war, free input
schemes and frequent loan amnesties have been blamed for this.) Early
indications are that the scheme is viable and will be extended to other
parts of Uganda.
IMPROVING ACCESS TO PURCHASED INPUTS WITHOUT
USING CREDIT
Credit is so often considered a key issue in expanding smallholder access
to farm inputs, that a surprising result of the NRI research and workshops
in Uganda and Zimbabwe, was the wealth of experience with schemes
which deliberately avoid such an approach.
Six approaches are described here:
. a seed and fertilizer hand-out scheme in Malawi;
. a scheme to sell inputs when farmers have available cash in Zimbabwe;
. tailoring seed services to farmers’ needs in Uganda;
. strengthening the informal seed systems;
. strengthening commercial input distribution networks in Uganda;
. public/private partnerships in farm inputs and extension in Zimbabwe.
The Malawi Starter Pack Scheme
The Malawi starter packs are intended to meet a short-term food security
need and address the longer term issue of declining soil fertility. They are
a response to growing food deficits and poverty in Malawi, and fertilizer
prices which are too expensive for most farmers following the economic
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. The packs contain cereal and legume
seed, and fertilizer. Each rural household receives one pack, enough for
0.1 ha or 60–100 kg of additional maize. The scheme is an initiative of the
Malawi Government and donors.
The scheme commenced in 1998, with the distribution of 2.53 million
packs. The actual cost of the project was US$ 25.12 million (approximately
70% more than anticipated). The distribution of the packs (involving
government agents as well as contracted services from private transport
companies and NGOs) worked well with relatively few problems
considering the scale of the operation and the time available.
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Preliminary findings (Kate Longley, personal communication) indicate that
few households followed the instructions to plant a 0.1 ha plot with seed
and fertilizer. The instructions were written in Chichewa, and not
understandable by non-Chichewa readers or non-literate people. Where
farmers chose not to use fertilizer or seed, this was due more to the view
that fertilizer was unnecessary or the seed inappropriate to the location
than the desire to sell the inputs. The groundnut seeds were regarded as
being of poor quality and seldom planted. Where they were, germination
was poor.
Government field assistants did not provide much advice to smallholders.
A lot of their time was spent in registration and distribution, which
interrupted normal activities.
The incremental yields appear to be between 60 kg and 80 kg. Highly
variable output prices make it difficult to put a precise value on this output
but preliminary indications are that the return on the cost of the pack is
only 1:1. In spite of its longer term objectives of the gradual (over 5–10
years) spread of improved technologies among smallholder farmers, the
starter pack scheme is largely perceived as a free inputs scheme, and a
short-term safety net.
Selling cotton inputs in Zimbabwe when farmers have
sufficient cash
In Zimbabwe three companies buy and gin smallholder cotton. The
smallest of the three does not operate an input credit scheme, and has no
plans to do so. Company officials consider input credit unnecessary
because their supply requirements can be met from large-scale producers
and from smallholders outside the other companies’ input credit schemes.
In addition, they wish to avoid the significant administrative burden they
perceive from operating such a service. Instead of being offered credit,
farmers can purchase inputs for the following season when they sell their
seed cotton, with no obligation to sell the next season’s crop. Such a
system has the advantage of not indebting smallholders, who in the
current economic climate (in November 1998 annual inflation was 35%,
and market interest rates were over 40%) may be reluctant to take credit
for fear of long-term indebtedness. High inflation also makes advance
purchase of inputs attractive to those farmers who can afford to do so.
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Tailoring seed services to farmers’ needs in Uganda
The Uganda Seed Project (USP) is a parastatal established in the 1960s
to meet smallholder seed requirements. Its operations include extensive
contract farmer seed multiplication schemes, quality assurance and seed
distribution. It concentrates on maize and beans although smaller volumes
of other grains and oilseeds are also supplied. As of 1999, plans are being
made to privatize a large part of its operations. In the run-up to
privatization there has been considerable analysis of the problems it has
faced and the implicit challenge to a new owner.
There are about 2.5 million farm families in Uganda who must use seed
from one source or another. The vast majority of them are small-scale
farmers. Uganda’s agro-ecological conditions permit the cultivation of a
diverse range of crops. Theoretically this should offer enormous
opportunities for seed companies. In practice, however, the use of
improved seeds has eluded the majority of farmers. Of the estimated
annual seed requirement for maize (10 000 t) and beans (90 000 t) only
15% and 1%, respectively are supplied by the formal seed sector. Box 2
summarizes the issues confronting USP in meeting farmer demand.
Box 2 What farmers need from seed suppliers
Technical
effectiveness
Good performance under farmer conditions/constraints.
Known response under different weather patterns or in different agro-
climatic zones.
Reliable
quality
Quality often not obvious until crop maturity/harvest so quality
assurance particularly important.
Genetic quality hard to guarantee with old varieties (used in Uganda for
beans and groundnuts) – requires deliberate, rigorous maintenance
breeding scheme.
Need robust systems to assure physical and physiological quality.
Inefficient delivery systems, poor infrastructure, the hot humid climate
and low levels of farmer literacy, have also contributed to quality
assurance problems.
Availability Timeliness.
Availability at location convenient to farmer.
Supply of crops/varieties farmers want, concentrating on those which
informal channels cannot service.
Pricing Farmer willingness to buy seed depends partly on multiplication factor
and market value of crop.
Farmers less willing to buy seed which is costly (low multiplication
factor) unless crop has high market value.
Low yields compound reluctance to use purchased inputs.
Packaging Required unit size (i.e. in small units).
Provides adequate protection/quality assurance.
Provides information.
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Providing smallholders with seed at a price they can afford is not likely to
be problem-free for any organization in Uganda. Climatic variability, poor
infrastructure and security problems all play a role. However, the USP
experience does provide some lessons and some of these can be
addressed with appropriate investment and systems, irrespective of the
exogenous constraints on supply.
Informal seed systems
Farmer sources of seed can be divided into four categories: own seed,
neighbours, local market and commercial seed. The informal system
comprises the first three. In Africa, farmers are often said to be dependent
on informal sources for 90% of their seed needs. Table 2 illustrates this
with data from the Machakos area in Kenya.
Table 2 Seed sources as a percentage of total seed use in Machakos area, Kenya
(short rains, 1983)
Own seed (%) Commercial seed (%) Neighbours (%) Local market (%)
Maize 83 12 1 4
Sorghum 77 8 8 5
Bean 89 2 2 7
Cowpea 80 2 8 10
Pigeonpea 81 1 2 15
Source: Muhammed et al. (1985); de Bruijn et al. (1994), cited in Longley and Richards (1998).
Informal seed systems are likely to remain important. Even in developed
countries, a significant proportion of seed planted has been retained from
the previous harvest. Once farmers have first acquired improved open-
pollinated varieties, they may subsequently use saved seed or informally
traded seed. Vegetatively propagated planting material, such as cassava,
is almost entirely dependent on informal sources – a point that became
abundantly clear when cassava mosaic disease in Uganda suddenly
created a need for large quantities of clean planting material which could
not be met initially by local sources.
In addition, agricultural systems in Africa are subject to rapid change as a
result of market liberalization (and changes in prices that affect choice of
technology and crop) and pressure to intensify. This means that informal
seed systems, notwithstanding their present effectiveness, will have to
adapt and change to meet different needs. This may have implications, for
example, for varietal selection and storability. NRI’s work in Kenya, Malawi
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and Ghana has indicated strong demand for improved varieties and
anecdotal evidence from Uganda echoes this, at least for open-pollinated
varieties.
Box 3 explores three aspects of informal seed systems: their attributes
(both positive and negative), ways in which they can be strengthened, and
intended outcomes. This is analogous to current thinking in rural finance
where there is a perceived opportunity to build on the strengths of informal
systems (notably in outreach), with some of the knowledge or technology
used by the formal system. There is very little experience in either area,
and a need exists to pilot and review such models.
Strengthening commercial input distribution systems in
Uganda
The Ugandan Government’s Agribusiness Development Centre (ADC),
with support from the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), has done considerable work on the intensification of maize and
bean production. This focuses on the use of improved seed, fertilizer and
crop management, sometimes with small quantities of chemicals, to
increase yields and reduce costs of production. ADC works with the
extension services and NGOs to expose farmers to these technologies
using small demonstration plots (to compare traditional and improved
systems), field days and farmer site supervision to reach approximately
120 000 farmers per annum. Rather than using credit, farmers have been
encouraged to draw on their own resources, and to make these
investments a high priority. ADC stresses the business management
aspects of farming.
Rural areas are poorly served by farm input networks and farmers usually
lack information on purchased inputs. An additional focus for ADC has,
therefore, been to try to bring inputs physically within reach of farmers, by
providing support to the input supply chain, i.e. wholesale importers,
district distributors and village stockists. The support provided under
ATAIN (Agent Training and Input Network) comprises:
. mediation between the parties concerned;
. a loan guarantee (on which there has so far been no call);
. training (product knowledge, safe use and handling, marketing,
record-keeping and business management).
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Box 3 Exploiting the potential of informal seed systems
Attributes of informal seed systems
1. May be considered better value for seed which is:
. bulky and, therefore, incurs high transport costs (e.g. grains and legumes)
. openly traded (e.g. grain) such that farmers know the price (e.g. grain)
. easily stored
. self-pollinated (and hence subject to slow genetic deterioration).
2. May be the only source of crops and varieties needed in small quantities to meet
local preferences, or suited to local, temporary or evolving conditions; local varietal
selection tends to yield seed which performs well locally.
3. Likely to be more accessible in rural areas.
4. Informal sources can supply seed on a timely basis (or not at all).
5. Informal systems are more robust in the face of major disruption (such as civil
war) but more vulnerable to local climatic risk than formal systems sourcing seed
more widely; aid agencies buy seed in Uganda for relief programmes in
neighbouring countries, and these ‘lumpy’ purchases lead to extreme volatility in
the prices and availability of formal sector seed.
6. Some crops which are almost entirely dependent on informal seed systems (e.g.
roots and tubers) are also those valued by farmers vulnerable to disaster (whether
man-made or natural) because they can be kept in the ground until needed.
7. Informally sourced seed cannot be certified, but it can be ‘truthfully labelled’.
8. The quality of farmer-saved seed tends to be good but subject to variable storage
management (work by NRI in Zambia and Ghana suggests that these practices
are often ‘passed down’ and probably not discussed much within the community);
seed management also tends to fall outside the extension system (extension
officers often take leave after the harvest, and are preoccupied with their own
demonstration plots at planting time).
Ways in which informal seed systems can be strengthened
1. Providing them with access to NARS/IARC-bred foundation (/breeder) seed.
2. Extension advice on seed production, processing, treatment and storage.
3. Supporting a legal framework that permits the marketing of uncertified, ‘truthfully
labelled’ seed which would conform to the prescribed standards regarding the
genetic purity, germination and moisture content for that variety, except that it
would not carry an official certification tag.
Intended outcomes
1. Greater availability, accessibility and affordability of seed which has locally
preferred characteristics.
2. Improved quality and reliability of seed sourced informally.
3. Greater integration of modern varieties into traditional seed systems.
4. Identification and wider dissemination of local varieties whose characteristics make
them suitable for wider cultivation.
31
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS07 - 037300/Improving Sm
29/5/01 09:34 Amended by Colin Wragg
ATAIN facilitates trade between five regional distributors and village
stockists, by guaranteeing small loans (made in the form of inputs
advanced) to the stockists by the distributors. There has been no call on
this guarantee so far, and stockists are not aware that the guarantee
exists. There are roughly 180 stockists participating in the scheme and all
have benefited from the guarantee.
The stockists also provide critical extension on the products and the
product training provided to the stockists has proved to be one of the most
popular components of the project. Just as stockists are able to be
extensionists, some government extension agents have become stockists
as well. If these distribution systems can be sustained, the challenge will
be to maintain objectivity in the advice provided by stockists.
Should stockists choose to advance inputs to their customers, without first
receiving full payment, ATAIN has no role in this transaction. (Certainly
such arrangements occur and village-level stockists are well-placed to
assess the credit risk before entering into such informal agreements.) An
estimated 30 000–40 000 farmers have benefited from improved access to
inputs. Despite these achievements, and the fact that ATAIN is operational
in one of the most agriculturally progressive parts of Uganda (Mbale and
Kapchorwa), smallholder demand for inputs is still very low (around 500 t
fertilizer/season).
The ADC is also working on output marketing to enhance farmer
confidence that his or her harvest will be sold at a fair price. This pilot
scheme illustrates the potential to improve access to inputs and underlines
the importance of co-ordinated action on technology transfer, input supply
and output marketing.
Public/private partnerships in farm inputs and extension in
Zimbabwe
With growing emphasis on the communal sector in Zimbabwe, input
companies are turning their attention to this potentially large market. Box 4
describes a number of pilot initiatives experimenting with ways to increase
communal farmer access to purchased inputs. Each of these has different
characteristics but all use partnership approaches and incorporate
extension. (Although one of these also uses credit, it is included here to
illustrate the potential when different players collaborate.)
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INPUT CONSTRAINTS
Box 5 summarizes how each of these schemes affects the key constraints
identified in the previous section. The schemes’ impacts are fairly evenly
spread across the five constraints (affordability, availability, information,
risk and uncertainty, and commercial context) and virtually all schemes
perform well in at least four of the five areas. Most of the schemes help
reduce risk by providing farmers with better information (on the appropriate
input to use, and recommended methods of application) or by an explicit
link to crop marketing. The table could be used as a check-list to identify
areas for improvement in poorly performing schemes. The Malawi scheme,
for instance, would be improved by better extension on the inputs
distributed and recommended practices.
Box 4 Piloting public/private partnerships in extension and inputs in
Zimbabwe
. Input supplier links with the Grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe Farmers Union and
transport brokers to reduce transport costs and exploit warehouse storage
available in rural areas.
. Input supplier links with cotton marketing companies to sell inputs at the point of
cotton sale (orders are taken, paid for, and farm delivery subsequently made by
the input company).
. Input company links with other input companies, government extension services
and farmers groups, with extension costs met partly by the input companies with
no conditions attached. (For example, Novartis has been working with a number of
local companies and supplying Agritex staff with motorbikes, which they
subsequently are able to buy, with payment by instalments.)
. Input companies working with NGOs and local retailers to support the
development of local retailer networks (by providing training and loan guarantees).
. Collaboration between cotton companies, banks and input supply companies, to
transfer farmers who reliably repay input loans from company schemes to bank
schemes, with the banks aiming to strengthen their rural outreach and savings
mobilization.
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Box 5 How different input schemes affect key constraints to farmer
use of purchased inputs
Scheme Affordability Availability Information Risk and
uncertainty
Commercial
context
Uganda credit More
affordable –
factored into
crop price
Improved – but
timeliness still
a problem
Information on
input package
Risk reduced
and decision
taken out of
farmers’ hands
Little or
negative effect
Zimbabwe
credit
Improved –
via credit
Little direct
effect
Package
includes
extension
Links to crop
marketing
reduce risk
Reinforces
commercial
approach
Outgrower
schemes in
Zimbabwe
Improved –
input credit
integral to
package
Improved
access to
marketing
system and
required inputs
Package
includes
extension
Risk reduced
and decisions
taken out of
farmers’ hands
Participation in
export
development –
though approach
is rather
paternalistic
Uganda
Centenary
Bank
Improved – by
credit
No direct effect Some
additional
extension
advice
Reduced a little
through
extension and
planning advice
Farmer
encouraged to
be ‘business-
like’
Malawi Starter
Pack Scheme
Improved –
inputs are free
Improved –
otherwise hard
to obtain
Some
extension –
but inadequate
Free inputs
shield farmer
from some
consequences
of risk and
uncertainty
Little or
negative effect
Input sales
when crops
sold
Improved by
timing of sales
Inputs made
available at
location suited
to farmer
Little direct
effect
Little direct
effect
Farmer
encouraged to
be ‘business-
like’
Farmers’ seed
needs in
Uganda
Improved by
small unit size
Timing, location
and seed type
all important
Little direct
effect
Risk reduced if
seed is of
reliable quality
Farmer can
more easily
develop farm
business
Informal seed
systems
Affordable local
sources
Improved Reinforces
informal
sources
Risk reduced –
locally suitable
Farmer can
more easily
develop farm
business
Building
commercial
input systems
in Uganda
Little direct
effect
Vastly
improved
Retailers give
product and
safe use
information
Information and
crop marketing
component
helps reduce
risk
Farmers can
more easily
plan/develop
farm – and
commercial
networks
expand
Partnerships in
Zimbabwe
Some effect on
costs via more
efficient use of
transport
Improved
services –
including
delivery of
inputs to farm
Improved
through
collaboration
on extension
Information
helps reduce
risk
Helps develop
rural economy
and services
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4
PRIORITIES FOR POLICY AND DIRECT
INTERVENTION
GETTING THE PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVED IN
SMALLHOLDER INPUT CREDIT
Credit is often considered the major issue in increasing farmer access to
purchased inputs. Yet smallholders are almost invariably poorly served by
the formal financial sector on account of high transaction costs associated
with small loans, a dispersed rural clientele, and poor information on crops
and marketing. In some situations, however, the private sector (notably
processors or traders) may be willing to extend input credit to smallholders
in order to overcome a supply constraint. Box 6 summarizes the factors
that influence the viability of such input credit schemes.
The significance of these categories, and particular aspects, is that they
need not all be present for a scheme to work, but most schemes will need
to incorporate several aspects to ensure a degree of success. For
instance, the Ugandan cotton example relied on buyers forming an
association (second crop market characteristic in Box 6), but for the
scheme to succeed it was also necessary for inputs to be provided in-kind,
and to incorporate several measures from the modus operandi group (e.g.
monitoring, extension and accessibility). The scheme can then function,
even if the overall commercial context is weak.
The Zimbabwean cotton credit example indicates that even when few
favourable crop market and input conditions are present (fertilizer and
cash are available on credit in Zimbabwe), it is nonetheless possible to
develop strong and viable input schemes. The success of the schemes in
Zimbabwe is dependent on the presence of favourable conditions relating
to overall commercial context and modus operandi.
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So-called ‘killer assumptions’ are also identified in Box 6, i.e. conditions
which would be favourable (for the operation of a credit scheme) if in
place – but rarely are so. They include: crop purchase monopolies, which
are increasingly rare; situations where all buyers can form an association
effectively creating a crop purchase monopoly; inputs that have no other
use or cannot be put to any other comparable profitable use; and
supportive institutions for contract enforcement (the importance of which is
particularly stressed by Dorward et al. (1998)). The latter is included
because although many countries may have appropriate legislation or
policy, there are often compelling political economy, implementation and
access factors that prevent its effective operation at a local level, or for
particular groups. Also, the buyers’ association approach (similar to the
Uganda cotton example described earlier) may be difficult to apply in
practice, because of unwillingness to take joint action. The fact that
Box 6 Factors which affect viability of commercial crop input credit
schemes
Effect
Crop market characteristics
Crop purchase monopoly and little food/farm use of crop
Possible for all buyers/users to form association and little food/farm use
Multiple marketing channels and/or food use
+
+
–
*
*
Input qualities
Inputs provided in-kind
Limited alternative use or market for input
Returns to input use are greatest for the crop in question
+
+
+
*
*
Commercial/credit context
Farmers treat farm as a business and are integrated into markets
History of loan amnesties, default without penalty, subsidized inputs
Supportive legal/political/contract enforcement institutions
+
–
+ *
Modus operandi of scheme
Group schemes for peer pressure
Group or individual schemes backed up by monitoring/good
information,
support staff and ability to act
+
+
Incentives for repayment and penalties for non-repayment
Appropriate incentives for field monitors/co-ordinators
Training provided to farmers – extension and business management
Developing relationship/trust/loyalty through field presence/contact
Accessibility of scheme – minimize red tape and transaction costs;
organize so location and timing of contact is convenient to farmers
Effective and timely monitoring of input use and crop marketing
+
+
+
+
+
+
* Denotes killer assumption if stated condition does not exist.
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favourable conditions rarely apply means that a viable scheme is
necessarily dependent on several measures which could be described as
best practice in lending to small-scale farmers.
Box 6 lists a number of ‘carrot and stick’ measures (under modus
operandi) which do not depend on unrealistic assumptions about, for
instance, the ability to enforce contracts using legal mechanisms (which
even if possible, would probably be very transaction cost-intensive). Their
focus on groups, training, monitoring and incentive systems makes them
initially costly but once in place, farmers can take on a greater share of
these costs (groups can act as crop assembly points and distribution
points for inputs, reducing the transaction costs inherent in reaching many
small farmers). Moreover, these measures build group/individual capacity
so that farmers are able to combine their knowledge of, for example, land
characteristics and agronomy, with information about inputs, and use this
to make informed decisions about input use. Without this capacity building,
technology packages tend to be inflexible (and, therefore, not ideal in all
situations) or costly in terms of extension (as seen, for instance, with
some of the intensively managed smallholder outgrower export horticulture
schemes in Africa). Nonetheless, the implicit start-up costs, and the fact
that the benefits are long-term (and also far wider than just the crop in
question) mean that they are only likely to be attractive to companies able
to take a longer view.
Such best practice mechanisms in rural lending are robust to different
situations. For instance, they are similar to the measures used by
Grameen Bank type schemes where inputs are not necessarily provided
in-kind or targeted to a particular crop. This approach, moreover, yields
benefits even where the marketing structure does not demand such an
approach. (The cotton company in Mali, for instance, which has a crop
purchase monopoly, nonetheless uses virtually all of these measures to
reduce transaction costs and increase cotton output.) There seems to be a
clear lesson here for Uganda also: whilst it is difficult to envisage a
preferable viable alternative to the existing scheme given current
conditions and circumstances (and this is true, despite all the problems in
the operation of the input scheme), it does not obviate the necessity and
desirability of investment in longer term measures aimed at more
sustainable and substantive improvements in smallholder productivity. At
the same time, it may be more difficult still to get commitment to such
long-term goals amongst a large group of companies (approximately 30),
including many that have only participated reluctantly in the scheme.
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NON-CREDIT MECHANISMS THAT MAKE INPUTS MORE
AFFORDABLE
In Uganda, seeds could be made available in packet sizes more closely
suited to farmer needs. Had appropriate packing plant been installed from
the outset, this would have added little to the unit costs of seed.
In Zimbabwe, input and cotton companies have collaborated to sell next
season’s cotton inputs when farmers sell their cotton harvest. This
arrangement is beneficial to all concerned without locking the farmer into a
credit agreement that s/he may find difficult to honour, and the cotton
company may find costly to monitor/enforce. From the cotton company’s
perspective, it is a relatively low-cost way to promote increased cotton
production, whilst the input company can make extra sales with relatively
low transaction costs. (Inputs are delivered to the farmer subsequently so
transport costs are incurred by the input company but savings are made in
rural retail and storage costs.)
In Zimbabwe, there has been collaboration between the cotton companies,
the input companies, transport companies and the banking sector, to
reduce the cost of farm inputs and services. Information has been shared
to enable transport costs to be reduced by the co-ordination on input and
output marketing. The banking sector has been able to ‘adopt’ reliable
agricultural borrowers (with the banks benefiting in the medium-term from
access to rural savings), enabling the cotton companies to achieve greater
coverage with their own loan programmes.
The most obvious way to improve affordability is through subsidy, though
this is rarely considered a sustainable option. In Malawi, inputs were
distributed free of charge to farmers but this must be regarded as an
exceptional response to an evolving crisis. Whilst subsidies clearly do not
offer a long-term solution, they may be able to play a role where they can
be carefully targeted and progressively reduced, or focused on particular
constraints within the distribution system. The ATAIN project in Uganda
provides a type of subsidy in that it provides an input (a guarantee) which
would not otherwise be available (or would not be available at reasonable
cost). Yet the hope is that this need not be unsustainable, because by
demonstrating the viability of the input distribution system, the perceived
risk (and hence cost) of involvement in input supply may be reduced.
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ADDRESSING OTHER FACTORS THAT CONSTRAIN
SMALLHOLDER ACCESS TO PURCHASED INPUTS
All the interventions described in the previous section addressed four of
the five issues identified: availability, information, risk and uncertainty, and
commercial context.
Availability
Improved availability of inputs is emphasized by most of the schemes
reviewed. There is good reason for this and much evidence to suggest
that it is a more important constraint than affordability. IFDC (1990), cited
by Larson and Frisvold (1996), reports that on average, farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa must travel 18 miles to the nearest fertilizer supply point.
Larson and Frisvold’s conclusions (IFDC, 1990 p. 522) emphasize the
availability constraint:
‘‘Several studies document that the simple physical availability of
fertilizer to farmers, in appropriate quantity packages and at the
appropriate time of the year, remains a constraint to increasing
fertilizer use in sub-Saharan Africa.’’
Several authors, including Shepherd (1989) and Larson and Frisvold
(1996) point to the inevitable role of the private sector in improving input
availability. In promoting this role, it is important that consideration be
given to the fact that private rural suppliers choose between different
products, for example, tinned food, soap powder, and farm inputs. The
ATAIN programme in Uganda, which focuses explicitly on the development
of commercial input networks, does not emphasize the need to improve
returns to fertilizer marketing relative to those obtained from other
products retailed in rural areas. Rather, ATAIN demonstrates that inputs
can be retailed profitably but the way in which it links this, responsibly, to
training in safe and appropriate use of inputs, almost certainly adds
significantly to retailing costs relative to those incurred on other products.
Interestingly, the private initiatives in Zimbabwe implicitly take account of
this by using retail points where synergies with other activities (and hence
economies of scope) can be exploited (sharing transport costs, and
marketing inputs alongside output purchases).
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Access to information
The need for better farmer information on inputs and yield response is
widely stressed, and is reflected in the extension component included in
some of the input schemes reviewed. The importance of extension in
improving the performance of input credit schemes is also widely
recognized. Improved information helps reduce the risk and uncertainty to
which the farmer is exposed when adopting new technologies.
The information constraint is partly an information flow constraint, but
there are also some fundamental gaps in knowledge on the technical and
economic effects of improved use of purchased inputs and other crop
management strategies. Although some of the necessary research has
been conducted (even if the results are not available, nor the conclusions
updated to reflect current prices), much has not, even in countries which
have accorded a relatively high priority to agricultural research (such as
Zimbabwe). As the pressure to intensify and develop packages which
African farmers can and will adopt increases, the need for research and
dissemination on farmer-adapted input and crop management strategies
becomes more critical.
For example:
‘‘No work has been done to revise, in view of changing soil, variety,
and economic conditions, the recommendations developed during
the early 1960s...
While introducing fertilizer as an essential input to achieve yield
increases is important, it is equally important that the correct
message on nutrient requirements by crop and by area is delivered.
The information presently available in Uganda on fertilizer nutrient
requirements for Uganda’s crops and soils is inadequate’’. (IFDC,
1999, pp. 11–12).
There is a key role here for publicly funded research. The private sector is
unlikely to do this research because it would be difficult to recoup such
costs through product sales. (Smallholders have limited purchasing power,
and the most useful research is likely to focus on synergies between
farmer-supplied and purchased inputs.) In many countries, a useful
starting point would be to collate and review existing information before
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identifying priorities for revision, updating and new research. The latter
comments may be particularly relevant to donor-funded activities.
Risk and uncertainty
Four categories of risk and uncertainty are identified in this study: weather
risk, market risk, uncertainty over input choice and quality, and uncertainty
over export market acceptance of produce treated with chemicals.
The schemes reviewed in the previous section relied principally on two
mechanisms to reduce risk and uncertainty: the provision of extension
advice to improve farmer knowledge on the correct choice and use of
purchased inputs, and links with output markets, such that the farmer
would be confident of selling his/her produce. Implicitly, most of the
programmes assured ‘fair’ retail prices for inputs, and some were able to
offer lower prices on account of bulk purchase orders (e.g. cotton inputs in
Zimbabwe). ATAIN argues that it tackles market risk (i.e. uncertainty over
output price) by improving the overall profitability of the farm enterprise,
such that a fall in output price is less critical.
Although farming is to some extent an inherently risky activity, there are
some other ways in which risk can be reduced. There is always a degree
of weather risk but in Uganda, the UGEA was negotiating commercial crop
insurance to cover the loan taken out for cotton farmer inputs, in the event
that natural disaster should lead to a significant reduction in the expected
cotton harvest. From the farmer’s perspective, there may be little that s/he
can do to reduce this risk, except by diversifying, and cultivating some
known drought-tolerant varieties. New varieties will carry a higher
perceived risk, and the risk of crop failure in the event of poor weather
conditions may indeed be higher. Moreover, the stakes will be higher still if
other purchased inputs have been used.
For some crops, unpredictable output prices are the major risk.
Interventions which lead to better market integration (i.e. smoother flows of
produce between surplus and deficit areas) will help to reduce (but not
eliminate) this source of risk. This might include improvements in
infrastructure (roads, telecommunications), financial services (such that
traders can more easily finance their operations), deregulation of rural
transport and trading to increase competition, and better information on
farmer production and market prices. In some countries, where large
41
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS07 - 037300/Improving Sm
29/5/01 09:34 Amended by Colin Wragg
unpredictable purchases of food crops for relief programmes in
neighbouring countries contribute to price volatility, it may be possible for
the government to negotiate with the donors to obtain advance notification,
and to smooth such purchases (over time and crops) where possible.
Improved information on inputs (including information on input quality
assessment criteria) will help to reduce the risk perceived by farmers in
using purchased inputs. The government can also play an important role
in setting and enforcing appropriate product standards, for example, in
seed quality. Where the government is itself involved in the supply of seed
or inputs, it should ensure that these meet the highest standards. (A failing
of the Malawi scheme was the poor germination rate of the groundnut
seed distributed.) Farmers often also face uncertain prices for inputs. In
Zimbabwe, input company representatives at the NRI workshop proposed
that input prices in rural areas should be monitored, because they feared
that unnecessarily high retail prices were undermining the scope to
develop the smallholder market.
Commercial context
The overall commercial context affects the production and marketing
strategies adopted by farmers. This not only affects output marketing
options, it influences the availability of retailers/traders willing to supply
farm inputs. Transaction costs are reduced as commercial activity
increases, and as the rural economy develops, more services become
available and affordable in rural areas. Government policies on market
reform and competition (for example, in transport and banking), and
infrastructure development, influence these trends, though on their own
they may be insufficient to fuel economic development in particular areas.
At the micro-level, extension programmes might reinforce these tendencies
by stressing farm budgets and marketing, but trends in the rural economy
are likely to have a greater bearing on farmer activities.
Governments and donors, however, need to consider carefully how their
actions and programmes affect the development of sustainable
commercial services in rural areas. In Uganda, private companies argue
that the establishment of viable rural farm input networks is undermined by
subsidized input programmes in Uganda and neighbouring countries. Such
programmes, which are normally donor-funded, are popular with farmers
and politicians alike. They are often undertaken as an emergency
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response, making it still more difficult to build an effective consensus
around the need to minimize this type of action. The input companies,
moreover, agree to supply them, thus undermining their own position
(though in the absence of co-ordinated action, if they did not do this, they
would simply see lucrative contracts go to their competitors, without any
progress towards the development of commercial networks). Yet, the
emphasis accorded to this problem in Uganda suggests that there is a
need to review the impact of such actions and develop alternative
strategies that offer greater prospects for the development of sustainable
supply networks in the medium term.
POLICIES TO PROMOTE SMALLHOLDER ACCESS TO
PURCHASED INPUTS IN AFRICA
Building on the conclusions above, policies to promote better access to
purchased inputs can be divided into two groups:
. agricultural sector policies;
. policies to promote general market development and competition.
Agricultural sector policies
. There is a need to avoid agricultural input interventions that
undermine the development of sustainable commercial input
distribution networks or contribute to poor financial discipline (such as
subsidized input schemes and loan amnesties). In dialogue with
donors, NGOs and private companies, governments should seek to
develop alternative strategies to deal with emergency needs that
assure longer term development goals.
. Support is required for the development of the farm input sector with
appropriate standards and regulation, information and training. There
is also a need to identify appropriate channels for dissemination,
exploiting opportunities in the commercial and voluntary sectors, as
well as with extension services and farmer groups or community-
based organizations.
. Promotion of public/private/NGO/farmer partnerships is important to
improve farmer access to purchased inputs. This process should
include identification of appropriate roles for government agents (for
example, in extension partnerships, or the pivotal co-ordinating role
played by CDO in Uganda). The process also implies building farmer
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group capacity, since the latter can act as a vehicle for extension,
input distribution, crop assembly and participation in wider consultative
processes.
. Research and information gaps need to be filled with respect to the
use of purchased inputs, especially combination packages that exploit
synergies between farmer-supplied and external inputs.
Policies to promote general market development and
competition
. There is a need to undertake further market reforms and liberalization,
for example, in relation to agricultural marketing (inputs and outputs),
financial services, and transport, to improve availability and
competition in rural services.
. Ensuring that the appropriate legislative frameworks and contract
enforcement mechanisms exist is important, as is accessibility to the
groups for which they are intended.
. There is a need for further development of rural infrastructure,
particularly relating to roads, telecommunications and electrification,
and support for effective maintenance systems for all these facilities.
Although these last three policy areas are not specific to input markets,
they contribute to the overall context in which the farming sector develops.
The four areas identified under agricultural policy, however, provide some
clear pointers on government actions to promote access to farm inputs,
whilst the earlier analysis provides guidelines on the nature and design of
direct interventions likely to succeed. Without exception, the latter depend
on constructive dialogue and collaboration between public and private
agents.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ADC Agribusiness Development Centre (Uganda)
ATAIN Agent Training and Input Network
CDO Cotton Development Organization (Uganda)
GDP gross domestic product
HYV high yielding variety
IARC international agricultural research centre
IFDC International Fertilizer Development Center
NARS national agricultural research system
NGO non-governmental organization
NRI Natural Resources Institute
UGEA Uganda Ginners and Exporters Association
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USP Uganda Seed Project
Printed in the United Kingdom by Hobbs the Printers Ltd
47
G:/Jobs/Standing/NRI Policy Series/PS07 - 037300/Improving Sm
29/5/01 09:34 Amended by Colin Wragg
